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Abstract
Increased penetration of wind energy will make electricity market prices more volatile. As
a result, market participants will bear increased financial risks. In this paper, we propose a
centralized approach to reduce such risks. We design a market for cash-settled call options
that can be run by a suitable financial entity such as an independent system operator, with the
aim of reducing the financial effects of volatile prices. A call option for electricity entitles its
holder the right to claim a monetary reward equal to the positive difference between the realtime
price and a pre-negotiated strike price in exchange for an upfront fee. Such options can reduce
profit volatilities. We provide theoretical guarantees, analytically characterize the outcomes of
the option trade over a copperplate power system example, and numerically explore the same
for a modified IEEE 14-bus test system. Our centralized approach makes volatility reduction
accessible to any electricity market participant and complements any wholesale market design.
1 Introduction
Wind energy is uncertain (difficult to forecast), intermittent (shows large ramps), and largely un-
controllable (output cannot be altered on command). They fundamentally differ from dispatchable
generation that “can be controlled by the system operator and can be turned on and off based
primarily on their economic attractiveness at every point in time” [1]. It has been a widely rec-
ognized fact that escalated penetration of wind will dampen electricity prices. Wind is a (near)
zero marginal cost resource, and hence, alters the merit-order at the base of the stack. “Free”
wind shifts the market supply curve to the right, leading to price reduction. Empirical evidence
corroborates that hypothesis, such as the analyses by Ketterer [2] for the German market, Munks-
gaard and Morthorst [3] for the Danish market, and de Miera et al. [4] in the Spanish electricity
market, among others. Green’s model-oriented analysis [5] for the British market resonates the
same sentiments.
A perhaps less studied effect of large-scale wind integration is its contribution to price volatility.
Dispatchable (and often marginal) generators need to compensate for variations in wind availability,
leading to variations in energy prices. Data from various markets support that conclusion, such as
the studies by Woo et al. [6] for ERCOT, Martinez-Anido [7] for New England, Jo´nsson et al. [8]
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for the Danish market, and Ketterer [2] for the German one.1 Gerasimova [10], studying the Nord
pool (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark), shows that intraday price variations in parts of Finland
and Sweden – measured in terms of the expected difference in daily on-peak and off-peak prices –
have roughly doubled during the period 2008-2016 from that in 2000-2007. Such trends are likely
to persist and perhaps grow, given the rapid growth in wind penetration.
How can market participants hedge against financial risks from these price variations? Financial
instruments, such as forwards, futures, swaps, and options, can help mitigate such risks; see [11–15]
for their use in electricity markets. In addition to hedging, options have been shown to mitigate
the effects of market power in electricity markets [16–18]. The focus of the current paper is on the
use of cash-settled call options, which are similar to insurance contracts. We utilize them to reduce
the volatilities in the profits of market participants due to increased penetration of wind supply.
One unit of such an option entitles the buyer to receive a cash payment equal to the real-time price
of electricity less the negotiated strike price in exchange for an upfront fee.
Options are typically traded bilaterally or in an exchange such as the European Energy Exchange
and the Chicago Board Options Exchange. In this paper, we propose a central clearing mechanism
for call options, where a market maker facilitates the trade of call options by ‘matching’ option
buyers and sellers. Our options market design is different from a traditional exchange. Here,
we allocate the collection of options bought among sellers with the goal to reduce the aggregate
volatilities in the profits received by electricity market participants. The market we propose is an
add-on to run in parallel with any electricity market design, and hence, does not advocate any
alteration to the current dispatch and profit structure in the electricity markets. Our contribution
complements the financial risk exchange between wind power producers proposed in [19], but it is
more general in the sense that we allow any electricity market participant to buy or sell options,
and propose hedging via a centralized market mechanism mediated by a market maker.
Section 1.1 introduces the generic notation used throughout. We propose our centralized clearing
mechanism for call options in Section 2, prove that it guarantees that aggregate volatilities do not
increase, and further show that it guarantees a zero expected merchandising surplus even if the
market maker is a profit-making entity. Next, in Section 3, we present a dispatch and pricing
model for a two-period electricity market that we apply our options market to, provide conditions
to guarantee strict volatility reduction for market participants, and discuss options market clearing
when the market maker is also the system operator (SO). Then, Section 4 analytically illustrates
volatility reductions through a stylized power system example, and demonstrate how our mechanism
generalizes bilateral contracts. We further conduct numerical experiments on the IEEE 14-bus test
system [20] in Section 5. The paper concludes in Section 6. Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
1.1 Notation
We let R denote the set of real numbers, and R+ (resp. R++) denote the set of nonnegative (resp.
positive) numbers. For z ∈ R, we let z+ := max{z, 0}. For a random variable Z, we denote its
expectation by E[Z], its variance by var[Z], and its cross-covariance with another random variable
X by cov(X,Z); note that cov(X,X) = var[X]. For an event E , we denote its probability by P{E}
for a suitably defined probability measure P. The indicator function for an event E is given by
1{E}. In any optimization problem, a decision variable x at optimality is denoted by x∗.
1Price variations differ considerably across a day; they are positively correlated with demand, as [5] concludes
from the British market. They also exhibit seasonal variations; these variations are greater in the summer, as the
Australian market analysis in [9] reveals.
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2 Centralized clearing of cash-settled call options
Consider a wholesale electricity market with multiple consumers and producers. The consumers
are utility companies or retail aggregators who represent a collection of retail customers. In this
model, we consider two types of producers – dispatchable generators and variable renewable wind
power producers. Dispatchable generators can alter their power output within their capabilities on
command, e.g., nuclear, coal, natural gas, biomass or hydro power based power plants. In contrast,
the available production capacity of variable producers rely on an intermittent resource like wind
energy. The system operator implements a centralized market mechanism to balance demand and
supply of power within the network constraints.
For now, we consider a 2-stage electricity market model. Identify t = 0 as the forward stage,
prior to the uncertainty being realized, and t = T , the real-time stage. Let (Ω,F ,P) denote the
probability space describing the uncertainty. Here, Ω is the collection of possible scenarios at t = T ,
F is a suitable σ-algebra over Ω, and P is a probability distribution over Ω. We assume that Ω is
compact, and that all market participants know P.
A cash-settled call option allows its holder the right to claim a monetary reward equal to
the positive difference between the real-time price pω,∗ and the strike price K of an underlying
commodity for an upfront fee. Consider the case where a player r buys a call option from another
player g. The option costs r a fee of q∆, where q is the option price and ∆ is the quantity. Once
they agree on the trade triple (q,K,∆), their profits in scenario ω are given by
Πωr (q,K,∆) := pi
ω
r − q∆ + (pω,∗ −K)+ ∆,
Πωg (q,K,∆) := pi
ω
g + q∆− (pω,∗ −K)+ ∆,
(1)
respectively. In each expression, the first term is the profit from the electricity market, and the
other two terms come from the option trade. Cash-settled call options provide a way to market
participants to reduce their profit volatilies, which are measured in terms of the variances. That
is, with a well-designed option, one would expect var[Πωi ] ≤ var[piωi ] for market participant i.
Peaker power plants are not always asked to produce in real-time, but they are critical for re-
source adequacy in wholesale markets [21]. The California Independent System Operator (CAISO)
and the Midcontinent ISO (MISO) have proposed flexible ramping products and buy capacities
from peaker power plants to provide them incentives to remain online. The above call options can
provide financial incentives for peaker power plants to stay in the market, without requiring the
system operator to purchase such capacities. For example, a peaker power plant g can participate
as an option seller, and receive profit of q∆ in the forward stage. On the other hand, wind power
producers face the risks of not being able to produce much power in real-time, and hence, they can
become option buyers and guarantee a reward in such events. This leads to incentives for both
wind producers and peaker plants to engage in such trades.
Options are often traded bilaterally between market participants, but in a wholesale market with
a collection of dispatchable generators G and variable generators R, one can conceive of |G| · |R|
bilateral option trades. It is difficult to convene and settle a large number of bilateral trades on a
regular basis. Financial exchanges provide an alternative that typically seek to maximize the surplus
from trading (options and other financial derivatives) with a collection of market participants,
without much regard to aggregate volatilities. In this paper, we take an alternate route, and
propose a centralized clearing mechanism for both buyers and sellers of call options with a goal
to reduce profit volatilities in electricity markets. Such an approach leads to critical outcomes: it
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makes volatility reduction accessible to any market participant, does not alter dispatch and prices,
and is applicable to any wholesale market.
Consider a market makerM who acts as an aggregate buyer for a collection of option sellers G,
and acts as a seller for the option buyers R. The system operator or a suitable financial institution
can fulfill the role of such an intermediary. In this paper, we primarily let M be social. We later
discuss how the problem would change if M = SO or M is profit-maker (selfish intermediary).
We now describe the step-by-step procedure for clearing the options market by a social M.
Forward stage:
• M broadcasts a set of allowable trades A0, given by
A0 := [0, q]×
[
0,K
]× [0,∆] ⊂ R3+,
to all market participants G ∪R.
• Each i ∈ G ∪R submits an acceptable (compact) set of option trades, denoted by Ai ⊆ A0.2
• M correctly conjectures the real-time prices pω,∗ in each scenario ω. Also, M knows the profit
functions piωi ’s of all market participants for each scenario ω ∈ Ω. 3 It solves the following
stochastic optimization problem to clear the options market.
minimize
∑
i∈G∪R
var[Πωi ],
subject to∑
g∈G
∆g =
∑
r∈R
∆r,
(qg,Kg,∆g) ∈ Ag, (qr,Kr,∆r) ∈ Ar,
δωg ∈ [0,∆g],∑
g∈G
δωg =
∑
r∈R
∆r1{pω,∗r ≥Kr},
MSω = 0,
 P− a.s.,
for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R,
(2)
where MSω is the merchandising surplus (sum of profits) for M in scenario ω, given by
MSω :=
∑
r∈R
qr∆r −
∑
g∈G
qg∆g
−
∑
r∈R
(pω,∗r −Kr)+ ∆r +
∑
g∈G
(
pω,∗g −Kg
)+
δωg .
The optimization is over (qr,Kr,∆r) ∈ R3+ for each r ∈ R, (qg,Kg,∆g) ∈ R3+ and F-measurable
maps δωg : Ω → [0,∆g] for each g ∈ G. We let δωg have finite energy, i.e., it belongs to the space
2M can fix a parametric description of A’s, and market participants report their parameter choices.
3It is also possible to consider revenue functions, which are easier to know in some contexts. For example, if M
is also the system operator, revenues can be known exactly. Such considerations are of interest and we relegate them
to future work, and for the purpose of this paper, we focus on profit functions. System operators often approximate
profit functions of market participants.
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of L2(Ω) functions. We use pω,∗r to denote the market price faced by r, and similarly do the same
for g.
The constraints in (2) dictate that the volume of options bought equals the amount that is
sold, all trades are acceptable to market participants, and options cashable in each scenario can
be allocated to the sellers. Imposing MSω = 0 ensures that the market maker maintains zero
balance from the option trade, and purely facilitates the trade among the market participants.
The objective aims at reducing profit volatilities in aggregate among acceptable trades.
• Buyer r pays q∗r∆∗r to M.
• M pays q∗g∆∗g to seller g.
Real-time stage:
• Scenario ω is realized, and the real-time prices of electricity pω,∗ is known to M.
• M pays (pω,∗r −K∗r )+ ∆∗r to buyer r.
• Seller g pays (pω,∗g −K∗g)+ δω,∗g to M.
The next proposition states that our mechanism is guaranteed not to increase (and possibly
decrease) the aggregate volatility of profits. Its proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Problem (2) admits an optimal solution that satisfies∑
i∈G∪R
var[Πω,∗i ]−
∑
i∈G∪R
var[piωi ] ≤ 0.
2.1 How participant i decides Ai
Consider a seller g ∈ G who expects a profit piωg in scenario ω. From the electricity and options
market, she receives a payoff of
piωg + qg∆g −
(
pω,∗g −Kg
)+
δωg
in scenario ω with the trade triple (qg,Kg,∆g), ifM allocates δωg ∈ [0,∆g]. Having no control over
δωg , assume that g conjectures the worst case outcome δ
ω
g = ∆g that minimizes her payoff, given by
Πωg (qg,Kg,∆g) := pi
ω
g + qg∆g −
(
pω,∗g −Kg
)+
∆g.
Evidence from electricity markets suggest that participants are often risk averse, e.g., see [11, 22].
To illustrate how the acceptability sets can be defined for risk-averse players, assume that a market
participant perceives risk via the conditional value at risk functional (see [23,24]), and finds a trade
triple (q,K,∆) acceptable, if
CVaRαi [−Πωi (q,K,∆)] ≤ CVaRαi [−piωi ] , (3)
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where piωi and Π
ω
i describe her profits from the energy market and the energy-cum-options market
in scenario ω. The CVaR risk measure is given by
CVaRα [z
ω] := min
c∈R
{
c+
1
1− αE
[
(zω − c)+]}
for an F-measurable map z. Parameter α ∈ [0, 1) encodes the extent of risk-aversion with a smooth
distribution. If zω is the monetary loss in scenario ω, CVaRα [z
ω] equals the expected loss over the
(1− α%) scenarios that result in the highest losses. If she is risk-neutral, she picks α = 0, leading
to accepting trades that satisfy
E
[
Πωg (qg,Kg,∆g)
]− E [piωg ] ≥ 0.
For each buyer r ∈ R, the set Ar is defined similarly. Note this if all market participants are
risk-neutral, it follows that ∑
i∈G∪R
E [Πωi (qi,Ki,∆i)]−
∑
i∈G∪R
E [piωi ] ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to the expected merchandising surplus being nonpositive (E [MSω] ≤ 0). The
constraints in (2), however, impose E [MSω] = 0, and hence it follows that
E [Πωi (qi,Ki,∆i)] = E [piωi ]
for each i ∈ G ∪ R. Our options market design is not limited to the above description of risk-
preferences. Market participants can freely choose the trades they find acceptable via Ag’s and
Ar’s. We illustrate the effects of risk-aversion later in Section 4.
2.2 Electricity markets with multiple ex-post stages
The proposed market for call options can run in parallel with wholesale electricity markets that
have multiple ex-post stages. For example, consider an electricity market with a forward stage at
t = 0, and multiple ex-post stages t = 1, . . . , T , where T > 1. Here, Ω is the collection of possible
scenarios at t ∈ {1, . . . , T},
Denote the price for electricity faced by i at t ≥ 1 by pω,∗i (t), where ω encodes a random
trajectory of available renewable supply. The options market can proceed as described, where the
price signal pω,∗i is the average electricity price over T periods, given by
pω,∗i :=
1
T
T∑
t=1
pω,∗i (t).
The profit to each market participant in the objective of (2) becomes the total profit over T periods.
That is, for a market participant i, denoting her profit from the electricity market at stage t by
piωi (t), her total profit becomes
piωi :=
T∑
t=0
piωi (t).
The options market is then defined with the parameters piωi and p
ω,∗
i for each i.
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2.3 When the market maker is a profit-maximizer
The options market mechanism in (2) assumes a social intermediary. Next, consider a selfish market
maker who aims at maximizing its expected merchandising surplus, and solves
maximize E[MSω],
subject to∑
g∈G
∆g =
∑
r∈R
∆r,
(qg,Kg,∆g) ∈ Ag, (qr,Kr,∆r) ∈ Ar,
δωg ∈ [0,∆g]∑
g∈G
δωg =
∑
r∈R
∆r1{pω,∗r ≥Kr}
 P− a.s.,
for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R.
(4)
Although the market maker here is motivated by maximizing profit, our next result (whose proof
is in the Appendix) says that a selfish intermediary does not make profits on average! However,
there are no volatility reduction guarantees when M is a profit-making entity.
Proposition 2. If each player i ∈ R∪G is risk-neutral, then, E[MSω,∗] = 0 at an optimal solution
of ( 4).
3 Application: A Stylized Two-Stage Electricity Market Model
In this section, we apply our mechanism to a simple, yet illustrative electricity market model to
demonstrate its properties.
3.1 Modeling the market participants
Let dωn denote the aggregate real-time demand in scenario ω at node n ∈ N, where N denotes
the set of all nodes. Let G and R denote the collection of dispatchable generators and variable
renewable wind power producers, respectively. We denote the collection of generators at node n by
Gn. We similarly define Rn. We model their individual capabilities as follows.
• Let each dispatchable generator g ∈ G produce xωg in scenario ω ∈ Ω in real-time. We model its
ramping capability by letting |xωg − x0g| ≤ `g, where x0g is a generator set point at the stage prior
to the real-time stage, and `g is the ramping limit. Let the installed capacity of generator g be
xcapg , and hence xωg ∈ [0, xcapg ]. Its cost of production is given by the smooth convex increasing
map cg : [0, x
cap
g ]→ R+.
• Each variable renewable wind power producer r ∈ R produces xωr in scenario ω ∈ Ω in real-time.
It has no ramping limitations, but its available production capacity is random, and we have
xωr ∈ [0, xωr ] ⊆ [0, xcapr ]. That is, xωr denotes the random available capacity of production, and
xcapr denotes the installed capacity for r. The cost of production for r is generally linear [25],
and hence we can take it to be a smooth convex increasing map cr : [0, x
cap
r ]→ R+.
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We call a vector comprised of xg for each g ∈ G and xr for each r ∈ R a dispatch. The SO decides
the dispatch decisions and the compensations of all market participants. We adopt the dispatch
and pricing model described below, which serves as a caricature of real electricity markets [26–29].
We also adopt the commonly used DC approximation of the power flow [30]. That is, if the supply
vector is denoted by x, and the demand vector is denoted by d, then the injection x−d ∈ P, where
P is the injection polytope defined as
P := {y| Hy <= L, 1Ty = 0},
where H is the shift factor matrix and L denote the capacities of the transmission lines.
3.2 Dispatch and pricing model
Assume that SO knows cg, x
cap
g for each g ∈ G and xr, xcapr , xr for each r ∈ R, and we have the
following two stages.4
3.2.1 The forward stage
The SO computes a forward dispatch against a point forecast of all uncertain parameters. In
particular, the SO replaces the random available capacity xωr by a certainty surrogate x
CE
r ∈ [0, xcapr ]
for each r ∈ R. A popular surrogate5 is given by xCEr := E[xωr ]. Denote the forward dispatch by
Xg ∈ R, g ∈ G, and Xr ∈ R, r ∈ R. This dispatch is the solution of the following optimization
problem, in which the system operator minimizes the aggregate cost of production needed to meet
the demand, given the forecasts of all random variables, and subject to the network constraints.
minimize
∑
g∈G
cg(Xg) +
∑
r∈R
cr(Xr),
subject to
∑
g∈Gn
Xg +
∑
r∈Rn
Xr = E[dωn ], X− d ∈ P,
Xg ∈ [0, xcapg ], Xr ∈ [0, xCEr ],
for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R, n ∈ N.
The forward price at node n is given by the optimal Lagrange multiplier of the energy balance
constraint. Denoting this price by P ∗n , generator g ∈ Gn is paid P ∗nX∗g , while producer r ∈ Rn is
paid P ∗nX∗r . Aggregate consumer pays P ∗nE[dωn ].
3.2.2 At real-time
Scenario ω is realized. Denote the real-time dispatch by xωg ∈ R, g ∈ G, and xωr ∈ R, r ∈ R. This
dispatch is the solution of the following optimization problem, in which the system operator mini-
mizes the aggregate real-time cost of production, subject to supply-demand balance and generation
4In practice, the cost functions are derived from supply offers from the generators and are often taken to be linear
combination of terms representing bidding blocks for each participant.
5See [29] for an alternate certainty surrogate.
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and network constraints.
minimize
∑
g∈G
cg(x
ω
g ) +
∑
r∈R
cr(x
ω
r ),
subject to
∑
g∈Gn
xωg +
∑
r∈Rn
xωr = d
ω
n , x
ω − dω ∈ P,
xωg ∈ [0, xcapg ], |xωg −X∗g | ≤ `g,
xωr ∈ [0, xω], for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R, n ∈ N.
The real-time (or spot) price is again defined by the optimal Lagrange multiplier of the energy
balance constraint, and is denoted by pω,∗n , for each n ∈ N. Note that X∗g computed at t = 0 defines
the generator set-points x0g for each generator g ∈ G. Generator g ∈ Gn is paid pω,∗n
(
xω,∗g −X∗g
)
,
while producer r ∈ Rn is paid pω,∗n
(
xω,∗r −X∗r
)
. The aggregate consumer pays pω,∗n (E[dωn ]− dωn).
Demand forecasts in practice are typically quite accurate. Notwithstanding the possibility of de-
mand uncertainty, for ease of exposition, we assume that there is no demand uncertainty, and, for
each n, dωn = d,, for all ω. The payments in real-time correspond to balancing energy needs in
real-time; the forward stage compensates for the bulk energy transactions.
The total payments to each participant is the sum of her forward and real-time payments. We
call the profits corresponding to these payments piωg for each g ∈ G and piωr for each r ∈ R in scenario
ω. The above benchmark dispatch model generally defines a suboptimal forward dispatch in that the
generator set-points are not optimized to minimize the expected aggregate costs of production [31].
Several authors have advocated a so-called stochastic economic dispatch model, wherein the forward
set-points are optimized against the expected real-time cost of balancing (cf. [32–35]). Our options
market design can operate in parallel to such an electricity market, and this model only serves to
illustrate the properties of the market design for options.
3.3 Conditions on strict volatility reduction for each participant
Proposition 1 guarantees volatility reductions in aggregate. Here, we provide conditions under
which strict reduction in volatility is guaranteed for each participant.
Proposition 3. When Problem (2) is applied to the two-stage electricity market model, the variance
in profits of participant i ∈ G ∪R reduces if and only if cov(2Aωi +Bωi , Bωi ) < 0, where
Aωr = p
ω,∗
r (x
ω,∗
r −X∗r )− cr(xω,∗r ), Bωr = (pω,∗r −Kr)+∆r,
Aωg = p
ω,∗
g (x
ω,∗
g −X∗g )− cg(xω,∗g ), Bωg = −(pω,∗g −Kg)+δωg .
for each r ∈ R and g ∈ G.
Proposition 3 (whose proof can be found in the Appendix) reveals that volatility of a participant
reduces when the total profits in real-time (from energy and options markets) are anti-correlated
with the profits from the options market alone. It aligns with the intuition that variance will
decrease when the options market supplements the profits from the energy market.
3.4 When the SO is also the market maker M
While the objective of M in Problem (2) is social, it might not be directly implemented by a
system operator. A modification needs to be implemented to allow the SO be the market maker
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M. In fact, as we show next, when M is the SO, we get a simplified version of (2). System
operators cannot differentiate between electricity market participants in terms of pricing due to
legal considerations6, that is, when M is the SO, we need
q = qr = qg, K = Kr = Kg, ∀r ∈ R, ∀g ∈ G. (5)
Hence, the SO would solve a simplified problem with fewer number of variables. Volatility reduction
guarantees provided by Propositions 1 and 3 still hold in this case.
4 Theoretical Insights from a Copperplate Power System Example
We present here a stylized single-bus power system example (adopted from [31]) and illustrate
how a bilateral trade (a cash-settled call option) can reduce the volatility in payments of market
participants, and even mitigate the risks of financial losses for some.
Consider a power system with two dispatchable generators and a single variable renewable wind
power producer serving a demand d. In this example, G := {B,P}, and R := {W}, where B is
a base-load generator, P is a peaker power plant, and W is a wind power producer.
Let xcapB = x
cap
P =∞, and `B = 0, `P =∞. Therefore, B and P have unlimited generation
capacities. B does not have the flexibility to alter its output in real-time from its forward set-
point. In contrast, P has no ramping limitations. For simplicity, let B and P have linear costs of
production. B has a true marginal cost 0 <  < 1, and offers a unit marginal cost. P has a true
unit marginal cost, and offers a higher cost 1/ρ, where ρ ∈ (0, 1], i.e., generators offer higher prices
than their true costs, which is an observed phenomenon in electricity markets [36].
Encode the uncertainty in available wind in the set
Ω := [µ−
√
3σ, µ+
√
3σ] ⊂ R+,
and take P to be the uniform distribution over Ω. That is, available wind is uniform with mean µ
and variance σ2. Scenario ω ∈ Ω defines an available wind capacity of xωr = ω. Further, assume
that W produces power at zero cost, and fixed demand d ≥ µ+√3σ.
This stylized example is a caricature of electricity markets with deepening penetration of vari-
able renewable wind supply. Base-load generators, specifically nuclear power plants, have limited
ramping capabilities. Natural gas based peakers can quickly ramp their power outputs. Utilizing
them to balance variability can be costly. Finally, (aggregated) demand is largely inflexible but
predictable. In the remainder of this section, we analyze the effect of a bilateral call option on the
market outcome for this example.
The benchmark dispatch model yields the following forward and real-time dispatch decisions
X∗, x∗,ω, and the forward and real-time prices P ∗, p∗,ω, respectively. See [31] for the calculations.
• X∗B = d− µ, X∗P = 0, X∗W = µ.
• xω,∗B = d− µ, xω,∗W = min{ω, µ}, xω,∗P = (µ− ω)+.
• P ∗ = 1, pω,∗ = (1/ρ)1{ω∈[µ−√3σ,µ]}.
6Note that in practice, prices faced by market participants can vary across nodes because of network considerations
and constraints, and there is no participant-specific pricing.
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The above dispatch and the prices yield the following profits for market participants in scenario
ω:
piωB = (d− µ)(1− ),
piωP = (µ− ω)+(1/ρ− 1),
piωW = µ− (µ− ω)+/ρ.
We start by considering a bilateral call option between P and W to illustrate such options can
reduce volatilities in profits, and contrast its outcome with our centralized mechanism, which is
shown to achieve further volatility reductions than an optimal bilateral contract.
4.0.1 Bilateral call option trade between W and P
We model a bilateral option trade between P and W as a robust Stackelberg game (see [37]) G as
follows. Right after the day ahead market is settled at t = 0, P announces an option price q ∈ R+
and a strike price K ∈ R+ for the call option it sells. Then, W responds by purchasing ∆ ∈ [0,
√
3]
options. Note that we impose an upper bound equivalent to the maximum possible shortfall. For
risk-neutral P and W , they would be willing to accept a higher ∆, but this would no longer hold
under risk-aversion, as we will demonstrate later. The bound we picked also allows for ease of
exposition.
Definition 1. We say (q∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗)) constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium, if
E [ΠωP (q∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗))] ≥ E [ΠωP (q,K,∆∗(q,K))] ,
where ∆∗ : R2+ → [0,
√
3σ] is the best response of W . Given (q,K), the best response ∆∗ satisfies
E [ΠωW (q,K,∆∗(q,K))] ≥ E [ΠωW (q,K,∆(q,K))] .
Two-player Stackelberg games, as here, are sequential games with one leader and one follower,
where the leader acts first, and then the follower responds. In the determination of her decision,
the leader anticipates how the follower would respond. In our game, P is the leader and chooses
(q,K), given the best response ∆∗(q,K) by W to the prices (q,K). We have the following result,
whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 4. The Stackelberg equilibria of G are given by (q∗,K∗) ∈ R2+ and ∆∗ : R2+ → [0,
√
3σ]
that satisfy one of the following two conditions:
(i) 2q∗ +K∗ > ρ−1, and ∆∗ = 0,
(ii) 2q∗ +K∗ = ρ−1, and ∆∗ ∈ [0,√3σ].
Over all equilibria with ∆∗ =
√
3σ,
var
[
ΠωW (q
∗,K∗,
√
3σ)
]
− var [piωW ] = −
3
2
q∗K∗σ2 < 0,
var
[
ΠωP (q
∗,K∗,
√
3σ)
]
− var [piωP ] = −
3
2
q∗(K∗ − 1)σ2.
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Figure 1: Profits for the copperplate power system example with µ = 10, σ2 = 1, ∆∗ =
√
3σ, and ρ =
√
3
20 .
Option trade allows W to avoid financial loss in the shaded set of scenarios.
The first kind of equilibria describes the degenerate case, where ∆∗ = 0. P and W engage in
trading at the second kind of equilibria, where 2q∗ + K∗ = ρ−1. For ∆∗ =
√
3σ, note that the
bilateral trade always guarantees volatility reduction for the wind producer W . For P , reductions
are only guaranteed for the equilibria that satisfy K∗ > 1. Furthermore, in expectation, profits are
unchanged. Similar conclusions can be drawn for any ∆∗ 6= 0. This stylized example illustrates
how call options can help with volatility reductions, but also shows that further improvements can
be attained, which can be done by applying our centralized mechanism, which yields the greatest
volatility reductions.
4.0.2 Outcomes of the centralized mechanism
Consider an options market with buyer W and seller P , where the intermediary M chooses a cap
on all option prices and volumes a priori. Let the price cap be given by the maximum real-time
price 1/ρ, and the trade volume be capped at
√
3σ, the maximum energy shortfall in available wind
from its forward contract. Said otherwise, M restricts trade triples to the set A0 := [0, 1/ρ] ×
[0, 1/ρ]× [0,√3σ].
Under risk-neutrality, the set of acceptable trades for P and W are given by
AP = {(qP ,KP ,∆P ) ∈ A0 : KP + 2qP ≥ 1/ρ},
AW = {(qW ,KW ,∆W ) ∈ A0 : KW + 2qW ≤ 1/ρ}.
(6)
From the above sets, it is straightforward to infer the feasible set of the options market clearing
problem in (2), given by (qW ,KW ,∆W ) = (qP ,KP ,∆P ) = (q,K,∆) that satisfies
2q +K = 1/ρ, δωP = ∆1{ω≤µ}, ∆ ∈ [0,
√
3σ].
The above trades coincide with the set of all (non-degeraate) Stackelberg equilibria of the bilateral
trade between W and P in Proposition 4. Given the objective of the options market clearing
12
Figure 2: The boundaries of AP and AW are portrayed respectively on the left and the right, for the
copperplate power system example in Section 4, when P and W both measure risk via CVaRα for different
values of α. In our experiments, we assume µ = 10, σ2 = 1 and ρ =
√
3
20 , and ∆ ∈ [0,
√
3], and compute the
sets via the technique outlined in [38, equation (6)].
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Figure 3: One line diagram of the IEEE 14-bus test system with wind generators added to buses 6 and 14.
We consider an options market between buyers r = 1, 2 and sellers g = 1, 2.
problem (2), we conclude that the trade mediated by the market maker finds an equilibrium with
the highest aggregate variance reduction. We characterize that reduction in the following result,
whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 5. The optimal solutions of (2) for the copperplate power system example are given
by (q∗W ,K
∗
W ,∆
∗
W ) = (q
∗
P ,K
∗
P ,∆
∗
P ) = (q
∗,K∗,∆∗), where
q∗ =
√
3σ
4ρ∆
−
√
3σ
8∆
,
K∗ =
1
ρ
(
2∆−√3σ
2∆
)
+
√
3σ
4∆
,
∆∗ ∈
[√
3σ(2− ρ)
4
,
√
3σ
]
.
Moreover, ∑
i=W,P
(
var
[
Πω,∗i
]− var [piωi ]) = −3σ28
(
ρ−1 − 1
2
)2
< 0.
Proposition 5 reveals that strict reduction of aggregate volatilities is guaranteed. In contrast to
Proposition 4, both W and P reduce the variance of their profits. To illustrate, let us consider the
case in which ∆∗ =
√
3σ, and note that q∗ and K∗ here constitute a subset of the non-degenerate
Stackelberg equilibria, and hence, forW , strict volatility reduction is automatic, also, for P , K∗ > 1,
and hence, strict reduction is also attained. Here, solving our centralized mechanism is equivalent
to picking the equilibrium that attains the greatest variance reduction from bilateral contracts.
Larger σ2 implies higher wind uncertainty, leading to greater variance reduction via our centralized
mechanism. We plot the profits of W and P across the scenarios with the parameters in Figure
14
1. Besides decreasing each player’s volatility (at no cost to the intermediary), the diagram reveals
how W is less exposed to negative profits than without the option trade. On the other hand, P is
now exposed to negative profits in some scenarios. Note that P here is risk-neutral, and we will
show later in the paper that if P is risk-averse, she hedges against such losses by requiring more
premium q in the forward stage.
4.0.3 The effect of risk-aversion
Using CVaR in (3) as a risk-measure, we plot the boundaries of AW and AP – the sets of acceptable
trades for the wind power producer and the peaker power plant in our copperplate power system
example, respectively – for various values of α = αW = αP in Figure 2.
7 Acceptable trades at each
α for W lie to the left of the corresponding surface. For P , they lie to the right of it. The surfaces
with α = 0 correspond to risk-neutral players. In that case, linearity of expectation allows one to
deduce that the acceptability of a trade is independent of the number of options ∆. As a result,
the surfaces for the risk-neutral case are vertical planes. That independence no longer holds for
risk-averse players, and the surfaces lose planarity.
As α grows, P requires higher forward premium (option price qP ) for a given volume ∆P .
Similar conclusions hold for W . She becomes less willing to accept trades with a higher forward
premium, the more risk-averse she gets.
5 Numerical Experiments on the IEEE 14-bus test system
We now explore the outcomes from the electricity and options market on a modified IEEE 14-bus
test system shown in Figure 3. We also let the intermediary be either a social or a profit-making
entity, and compare both outcomes. Relevant data is adopted from MATPOWER [40]. Two wind
power producers are added to the network at buses 6 and 14, each with a uniformly distributed
available wind with mean 50 MW. All transmission lines are assumed to have a capacity of 35 MW,
except that between buses 1 and 2 (20 MW) and another between buses 2 and 4 (20 MW).
Consider an options market with the wind power producers at buses 6 and 14 as buyers, and
the dispatchable generators at buses 6 and 8 as sellers. The sellers are generators with higher
production costs compared to others in the power system. Assume zero production costs for the
wind generators. We have the following marginal costs, reflecting offers by producers
cg(x) = 0.01x
2 + 40x, g ∈ G.
Furthermore, we have three real-time prices of interest (one for each bus at which there is a
buyer/seller), pω,∗6 , p
ω,∗
8 and p
ω,∗
14 . Each seller/buyer preferences and option trade payments are
related only to her corresponding bus’s day-ahead and real-time price. We further assume that the
true marginal production costs for each generator g is 20 $/MWh.8 In our experiments, we use
∆¯ = 10 MW, and vary the available wind between 40 and 60 MWs. The market clearing procedure
is implemented as a Jupyter notebook at [41].9
7The current diagram stands as a correction to [39, Figure 2].
8Assuming truthful bidding does not change the applicability of our mechanism, since it is applicable to any profit
function. Here, we let peaker power plants bid higher costs to resemble a realistic phenomenon [36].
9The problem in (2) is nonconvex and nonlinear, that we solve using sequential least-squares quadratic pro-
gramming [42]. Nonsmooth functions 1{x≥0} and (x)
+ are replaced by their smooth surrogates
(
1 + e−βx
)−1
and
x
(
1 + e−βx
)−1
, respectively for a sufficiently large β.
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Figure 4: Profits to the buyers/sellers in the IEEE 14-bus system with and without the options market
trade. The figure on the left considers a social intermediary, while the one on the right is derived with a
profit-maximizing one. Here, participants are risk-neutral.
Figure 4 plots the profits of the market participants with and without the options market. Seller
g = 1 at bus 6 is never dispatched, and hence, receives no profit in the electricity market. Thus, the
variance of his profit was zero; it is also kept almost zero after the options trade. On the contrary,
the options market reduces the variance for seller g = 2 drastically (he receives almost the same
profit for all scenarios).
When M is a profit-maximizer, there are no guarantees on volatility reduction. We apply the
above scheme to the modified IEEE 14 bus system and plot the outcomes in Figure 4, and notice
that variance reduction for g = 2 disappears. Although the market maker here is motivated by
maximization of profit, our result in Proposition 2 showed that a selfish intermediary does not make
profits on average.
Call options are instruments to hedge against temporal price variations. One can also hedge
against spatial price variations using instruments such as Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) [43].
Holding f FTRs between buses a and b entitles a market participant to receive a payment of
FTRω(a, b, f) := (pω,∗b − pω,∗a )f
in scenario ω. Thus, an option buyer r ∈ R located at bus b holding an FTR between buses a and
b receives a total profit of
Πωr = pi
ω
r + FTR
ω(a, b, f)− q∗r∆∗r +
(
pω,∗b −K∗r
)+
∆∗r .
Figure 5 illustrates how r = 2 can reduce its volatility by holding f = 20 MW worth of FTR’s
between buses 9 and 14, in addition to the reduction it attains from the option trade.
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Figure 5: Variance reduction in the profits of r = 2 as a function of σ2 in the IEEE 14-bus test system.
Holding an FTR between buses 9 and 14 increases the reduction, due to locational price variation.
6 Concluding remarks
Price volatility in electricity markets is an inevitable consequence of integrating large scale wind
energy. In this paper, we have proposed a centralized market for call options for market participants
to tackle the attending financial risks. The centralized mechanism (mediated by a market maker)
generalizes bilateral trading of call options. On a stylized copperplate power system example, this
market provably reduces the profit volatilities of market participants. Numerical experiments on an
IEEE 14-bus test system also appear encouraging. This work provides the foundation for a number
of future research endeavors. For adoption in practice, one needs to estimate the trade volume
with real market data from regions with high wind penetration (e.g., Germany, Texas, Denmark).
Finally, operating such an options market in conjunction with current electricity markets will require
a carefully designed legal and regulatory framework.
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7 Appendix (proofs)
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that Ω is compact and δg ∈ L2(Ω) for each g. The constraint set of (2) is then compact. An
appeal to Weierstrass Theorem [44] guarantees the existence of an optimum, given the continuity
of the objective function. All ∆’s being zero constitutes a feasible point of (2), call it z, and it
yields var [Πωi (z)] = var [pi
ω
i ], for each i ∈ G ∪R. Thus, the minimizer must satisfy∑
i∈G∪R
var[Πω,∗i ]−
∑
i∈G∪R
var[piωi ] ≤ 0.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Existence of an optimal solution follows along the same lines as in Proposition 1. The definitions
of Ag, Ar then yields
E
[
Πωg
]− E [piωg ] ≥ 0, E [Πωr ]− E [piωr ] ≥ 0
for each g ∈ G and r ∈ R. Summing the above inequalities over all g and r yields E[MSω] ≤ 0.
Furthermore, E[MSω] = 0 is achieved at a feasible point with all ∆’s being identically zero. That
completes the proof.
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
From (7) and (9), we have
var [Πωr ]− var [piωr ]
= 2cov(piωr , V
ω
r ) + var [V
ω
r ]
= cov(2[P ∗rX
∗
r + p
ω,∗
r (x
ω,∗
r −X∗r )− cr(xω,∗r )] + V ωr , V ωr )
= cov(2pω,∗r (x
ω,∗
r −X∗r )− 2cr(xω,∗r ) + (pω,∗r −Kr)+∆r,
(pω,∗r −Kr)+∆r)
= cov(2Aωr +B
ω
r , B
ω
r )
for each r ∈ R. The argument for g ∈ G is similar and omitted for brevity.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Let P choose (q,K) ∈ R2+. Then, W ’s payoff from the option trade alone is given by
V ωW (q,K,∆) := Π
ω
W (q,K,∆)− piωW , (7)
which, upon utilizing (1), yields
E [V ωW (q,K,∆)] =
{
−q∆, if K > 1/ρ,
−∆2
(
2q +K − ρ−1) , otherwise.
We now describe W ’s best response to P ’s action.
• If 2q +K < ρ−1, then W responds by playing ∆ = √3σ.
• If 2q +K = ρ−1, then W is agnostic to ∆ in [0,√3σ].
• If 2q +K > ρ−1, then W chooses ∆ = 0.
Define V ωP (q,K,∆) := Π
ω
P (q,K,∆) − piωP , as the payoff of P from the option trade. Then, the
relation in (1) yields
E [V ωP (q,K,∆)] = −E [V ωW (q,K,∆)] . (8)
Given W ’s choices, we have the following cases.
• If 2q +K < ρ−1, then E [V ωP (q,K,∆)] < 0. Therefore, P will avoid playing such a (q,K).
• If 2q +K = ρ−1, then E [V ωP (q,K,∆)] = 0, and P is agnostic to W ’s choice of ∆ in [0,
√
3σ].
• If 2q +K > ρ−1, then W responds with ∆ = 0. And, P receives zero income from option trade.
Combining them yields the equilibria of G. Now, the difference in variances for W with and
without the option trade can be shown to equal
2cov(piωW , V
ω,∗
W ) + var
[
V ω,∗W
]
. (9)
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When 2q∗ +K∗ = ρ−1, we have
V ω,∗W (q
∗,K∗,∆∗) =
{
q∗∆∗, if ω ≤ µ,
−q∗∆∗, otherwise.
Utilizing piωW = µ− (µ− ω)+/ρ and V ω,∗W from the above relation in (9), we conclude
var [ΠωW (q
∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗))]− var [piωW ]
= −(2/ρ)cov((µ− ω)1{ω<µ}, V ω,∗W ) + var
[
V ω,∗W
]
= − 1
ρ
√
3σ
∫ µ
µ−√3σ
(µ− ω)q∗∆∗dω + (q∗∆∗)2
= −q
∗∆∗
√
3σ
2ρ
+ (q∗∆∗)2
= −q∗∆∗
√
3σ
(
q∗ +
K∗
2
)
+ (q∗∆∗)2
= (q∗)2∆∗(∆∗ −
√
3σ)− q∗K∗∆∗
√
3σ/2. (10)
The last expression is nonpositive because ∆∗ ∈ [0,√3σ]. For P , we have piωP = (µ− ω)+(1/ρ− 1)
and V ω,∗P = −V ω,∗W . Therefore, similarly, we get
var [ΠωP (q
∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗))]− var [piωP ]
= (q∗)2∆∗(∆∗ −
√
3σ)− q∗(K∗ − 1)∆∗
√
3σ/2. (11)
The rest follows from substituting ∆∗ =
√
3σ in (10)-(11)
7.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The feasible set of (2) for the copperplate power system example coincides with the set of nontrivial
equilibria of the bilateral trade. We conclude from (10)-(11) in the proof of Proposition 4 that (2)
amounts to solving
minimize 2q2∆(∆−
√
3σ)− qK∆
√
3σ + q∆
√
3σ/2,
subject to 2q +K = ρ−1, q ≥ 0,K ≥ 0,
0 ≤ ∆ ≤
√
3σ.
(12)
Substituting for K = ρ−1 − 2q, the objective function of the above problem simplifies to 2q2∆2 −
q∆
√
3σ(ρ−1 − 1/2). Being convex quadratic in q, it is minimized at
q∗(∆) = min
{√
3σ(ρ−1 − 1/2)
4∆
,
1
2ρ
}
for each ∆ ∈ [0,√3σ]. Split the analysis into two cases:
• Case ∆ ≤
√
3σ(2−ρ)
4 : Then, q
∗(∆) = 12ρ , and the objective function of (12) simplifies to
1
2ρ2
∆(∆−
√
3σ) + ∆
√
3σ
4ρ . That function is minimized at ∆
∗ =
√
3σ(2−ρ)
4 , taking the value −3σ
2
8 (ρ
−1− 1/2)2.
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• Case ∆ >
√
3σ(2−ρ)
4 : Then, we have q
∗(∆) =
√
3σ(ρ−1−1/2)
4∆ for each ∆, for which the objective
function of (12) further simplifies to a constant −3σ28 (ρ−1 − 1/2)2.
Combining the above two cases and computing the variance reduction at the outcome yields the
stated result.
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